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Abstract: With increasing interest in renewable energy from agriculture, including biopower 
and cellulose ethanol, several aspects of the industry must be understood.  Study of the 
organization of the biopower industry represents an under researched area and a new 
application of transaction cost theory to an emerging industry.  Refinement of the theory can 
also result from challenging applications.  This article provides an application of transaction 
cost economics to the existing United States biopower industry while challenging the 
empirical convention of excluding production cost variables from transaction cost analysis. 
Utilizing survey data from 53 biopower generators, scale is modeled as a transaction cost 
variable in explaining the choice of organizational from.  Consistent with transaction cost 
theory, the probability of observing internal organization is found to be negatively correlated 
to scale.  Given this evidence, this article reconsiders the impact of scale and transaction 
costs on the choice of organizational from. 
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Recent years have seen a growing interest in the development of renewable energy industries 
for environmental, rural growth and development, and energy security benefits.  While the 
technical aspects of biopower production have been extensively studied (van Loo and 
Koppejan, 2003 and Klass, 1998), little is known about the economic organization and 
governance of biopower.  How should agro-biopower facilities procure their fuel, from the 
spot market, through contracts with independent biomass producers, by producing the 
biomass themselves, or by some combination of external and internal procurement?  What 
are the characteristics of purchase and supply contracts in biopower?  Who will be the major 
players in biopower, existing power companies that convert to biopower production or new 
entrants? Can incumbents operate multiple facilities, some using biomass and others using 
non-renewable fuels, or will firms tend to specialize in one technology or the other?  
  To begin addressing these questions, we focus on a fundamental question in the 
economic theory of the firm (Coase, 1937), the “make-or-buy decision.”  Using the 
transaction cost framework developed by Williamson (1985, 1996), we examine the vertical 
structure of the biopower industry with survey data from 53 US biopower producers.  Our 
analysis focuses not only on asset specificity—the main variable of interest in the empirical 
transaction cost literature (Klein, 2005)—but also on the technology of production and the 
corresponding economies of scale.  While transaction cost economics (TCE) allows 
production costs to affect governance—indeed, in the integrated Riordan and Williamson 
(1985) model, production costs and transaction costs are determined jointly—in practice, 
most of the empirical literature has taken production costs as given and focused on 
transaction costs.  Or, as Langlois and Foss (1999) describe the problem, the TCE literature   2
tends to assume that knowledge about production is easily and costlessly acquired, while 
transacting is fraught with hazards brought about by information and agency costs.  
  Our results suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that asset specificity is not a statistically 
significant determinant of vertical integration in biopower.  Instead, characteristics of the 
production process, such as economies of scale, appear to be more important.  Moreover, 
several firms in our sample both make their own biomass and purchase biomass from 
independent suppliers, a practice difficult to explain within the usual “make-or-buy” 
framework of TCE.  This suggests not only that empirical analysis in the theory of the firm 
must take scale into consideration, but also that the standard TCE framework may require 
modification to account for complex arrangements such as simultaneous internal and external 
procurement.   
 
Literature 
Biomass and bioenergy  
Biomass and bioenergy researchers have rarely considered organizational issues or applied 
an adequate organizational theory to this nascent industry.  Klass (1998) draws attention to 
this failure in the area of storage and shipping strategies for wood biomass.  The storage and 
shipping methods prescribed in the literature have not occurred in industry practice (Klass 
1988, p.554).  Further, van Loo and Koppejan (2003) document examples in Europe where 
organizational adaptations have solved technological problems.  Their work underscores the 
importance of understanding organizational issues.  
Other authors recognize the importance of non-technical barriers in biomass 
production which could include organizational issues.  Roos et al. (1999) and Costello and   3
Finnell (1998) develop broad-based frameworks for considering organizational issues.  They 
identify critical factors in the choice of organization including the degree of integration, the 
scale of operation, the degree of competition, the institutions environment such as national 
and local policy including public infrastructure availability and the perceptual beliefs of key 
actors.  Rösch and Kaltsehmitt (1999) identify similar topics adding insurance issues and 
efficiency of knowledge and information flows along the supply chain.  Lunnan (1997) takes 
an in-depth view of the institutional environment created by bioenergy policy, and especially 
how bioenergy policy and more general agricultural policy can be coordinated.  Building on 
this literature, that recognizes the importance of organization in general, this article focuses 
on applying transaction cost economics and specifically the effects of scale and transaction 
costs.   
More recently Downing et al. (2005) describe the role of agricultural cooperatives in 
research, financing, and exchange mechanisms in the agro-bioenergy industry.  Biopower 
cooperatives can be regarded as a type of biomass exchange mechanism that could be 
compared to contracting and spot market systems that also exist in the U.S. biopower 
industry.  However, for this comparison an adequate organizational theory is required.     
  Overend (1993) provides a description of the main features of a general biomass 
industry.  While Overend identifies only short-term contracts or spot-market procurement as 
the most viable alternatives, many biomass industries currently rely on captive supplies and 
integrated systems for fuel procurement.  Our survey of the current United States biopower 
industry reveals that approximately half of the industry relies on vertical integration or self 
procurement systems.  The underlying question is when are spot markets preferable, and   4
when do more integrated procurement systems better serve emerging agro-biopower 
industries?  Again, an adequate organizational theory is required to answer such questions.   
Choinière (2002) presents a formal model of the biopower industry.  The model 
analyzes the farmer’s investment decision in the presence of learning-by-doing and 
concludes that underinvestment by farmers and power generators could occur.  The choice of 
organizational form could address the underinvestment problem if the form chosen 
adequately protects both trading partner’s investments.  
Some financial feasibility studies have addressed the issue of market organization. 
But these are generally limited to a footnote or raised as an area of future research.  Nelson 
and Lamb (2002) study the financial feasibility of an anaerobic digester technology and 
conclude that a single utility should build and operate multiple digesters in multiple 
locations.  This prediction is not born out by experience of the livestock waste-to-power 
industry, however, where individual livestock operations and power production are being 
integrated rather than having one business own and operate multiple digesters in multiple 
locations.  
 
Transaction cost economics  
To address these issues, we turn to the transaction cost theory of vertical integration (Joskow, 
2005).  The key to transaction cost economics (TCE) is the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis, which states that economic actors will “align transactions, which differ in their 
attributes, with alternative governance structures, which differ in cost and competence, so as 
to realize a transaction cost economizing result” (Williamson 1996, p.371).  The theory holds 
that economic agents behave in a way that transactions, which vary in degrees of asset   5
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, are aligned with organizational forms, which can be 
considered efficient if no feasible alternative can be implemented with net gains.  The central 
problem, in Williamson’s framework, is addressing bilateral dependency that an increase in 
asset specificity or relation specific investments creates.   
Riordan and Williamson’s (1985) formulation seeks to integrate TCE with 
neoclassical production theory.  Extending the basic TCE model to include production costs, 
Williamson (1985) and Riordan and Williamson (1985) argue that markets have a production 
cost advantage over internal organization for different levels of asset specificity because the 
market can realize economies of scale and scope from aggregation of demand (Williamson 
1985, p.92).  The market organization can sell the product on a larger scale while internal 
organization only produces for itself.  Internal organization, if it only produces for itself, 
cannot receive the aggregation benefits.  Thus as scale economies increase market 
organization is more likely than internal organization.  
This model can be depicted as a cost-minimization problem, as described below. 
Market organization and internal organization are assumed to have different transaction 
costs.  When asset specificity is low, market transaction costs are lower than the costs of 
internal organization, but as asset specificity rises, the costs of market transacting increase 
more rapidly than the costs of internal organization, such that at some threshold level of asset 
specificity, internal procurement is the least costly alternative. 
These implications are also explained graphically in Williamson (1991). In 
Williamson’s (1991) notation, M is market governance costs, H is hierarchy (or internal 
organization) and X is used to indicate governance costs of hybrid forms, such as long-term   6
contracting. Adding hybrid simply implies: M(0)<X(0)<H (0) and M’>X’>H’>0.  Figure 2 
demonstrates Williamson’s 1991 model.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows that for k< 1
_
k  the market will be most efficient, that is, M (k) is the 
lowest over that range.  For values of asset specificity between  1
_
k  and 2
_
k , hybrids have the 
lowest governance costs and will be most efficient.  Finally, hierarchy will have the lowest 
costs for values of k> 2
_
k .   
The lower envelope becomes the collection of low governance costs.  The 
organization forms that correspond with those points will be most efficient.  If additional 
curves were added for multiple organizational structures, including different contractual 
arrangements (short term, long term, formal, informal), firm organization (joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, cooperatives), and even government, the resulting lower boundary would 
be a concave envelope of least cost organizational forms.   
The benefit of this version of the model is that comparative statics can be easily 
conducted.  Shift parameters (θ) include technological change, policy and uncertainty.  For 
instance, if policy is implemented that discourage hierarchy (perhaps for monopoly power 
reasons), this would cause an upward shift in H(k).  The change in policy would increase 
2
_
k and make hierarchy less likely compared to hybrid.  However, the incidence of market 
would remain unaffected. 
Two empirical implications emerge from this theory.  First, asset specificity is 
positively correlated with vertical integration and negatively correlated with spot market 
organization.  Second, scale economies are positively related to market procurement and   7
negatively related to vertical integration.  Thus, according to the theory, given economies of 
scale the market organization is more likely in the biopower industry as scale increases 
because internal organization is unable to realize aggregation benefits realized by the market.  
 
Empirical research in transaction cost economics 
Previous empirical research in a variety of industry settings has tended to support the basic 
predictions of TCE, particularly regarding the relationship between asset specificity and 
vertical integration.  Scale has not normally been incorporated into TCE models, however, 
and those that do use scale as an explanatory variable find mixed support for TCE theory 
regarding the impact of scale on the choice of organizational form (Wilson, 1980, Wiggins 
and Libecap, 1985, and James et al., 2005).  Empirical studies that test TCE range in the level 
of focus and type of analysis.  Types of analyses include qualitative case studies, quantitative 
case studies and cross sectional analyses (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  The focus has ranged 
from contract provisions, to the governance level, to the institutional environment.  The types 
of industries analyzed range from the auto sector, airline industry, coal markets and oil and 
natural gas industries.  Shelanski and Klein (1995) and Boerner and Macher (2001) provide a 
broad review of this literature.   
In most of the empirical literature the choice of organizational form is modeled as 
some function of asset specificity and other explanatory variables.  Cross-sectional analyses 
often utilize a logit or probit model to deal with the qualitative nature of the dependent 
variable.  Some contractual attributes, such as prices, length of contracts, or other measurable 
contract provisions, can be modeled as continuous variables, though the presence of a 
contract provision is typically measured as a qualitative variable.   8
Studies that use scale or size as a transaction cost explanatory variable include 
Saussier (2000), who uses scale as an indicator of asset specificity.  The capacity and other 
features of ships are used to indicate the level of physical asset specificity.  Wiggins and 
Libecap (1985) find that, contrary to TCE, that firm size is positively related to vertical 
integration in oil field organization.  In agriculture, the use of contracts and vertical 
integration are found to be positively correlated with farm size (James et al.,2005).  In other 
work, Wilson (1980), uses the size of fishers as an indicator of trust.  Anecdotally, larger 
fishers tend to have long term reciprocal relationships with buyers.  Again size is found to be 
positively correlated with hierarchy.  
Thus support for scale as transaction cost variable is weaker than support for asset 
specificity.  Results from our data do support the statistical significance and predicted sign of 
scale.  As the scale of a power plant increases it is more likely to use external procurement 




Our data come from a biopower generator survey conducted by the University of Missouri-
Columbia. We began with a list of 210 firms identified by the Energy Information 
Administration as producing power from wood or agricultural biomass sources in 2003. The 
Energy Information Administration conducts an annual questionnaire of all power plants that 
have a capacity of one megawatt or greater.  Of the 210 companies, 12 have plants that are 
listed as retied, leaving 198 in active production.  Of the active-production plants, 164 are   9
listed as operable, 17 are on stand by and 17 are listed as out of service.  Mail surveys were 
sent to the 198 active companies and 53 responded, a 27 percent response rate.   
In the biopower industry, key assets include the power plant and storage, collection, 
and transportation equipment.  The degree of asset specificity of these assets varies.  Thus the 
theory would suggest the types of organizational arrangements should vary with the level of 
asset specificity. 
There are three general organizational alternatives.  The first is vertical integration or 
internal procurement.  Vertically integrated systems typically involve the biomass producer 
integrating forward into biopower production and in more rare cases power producers 
backward integrating into biomass production.  A second organizational choice is external 
procurement.  This system involves independent power producers purchasing biomass as fuel 
for their generation needs from independent biomass producers.  This category includes both 
the use of spot markets, formal contracts, and informal arrangements.  Third, firms can 
procure part of their fuel need from in-house sources and source the rest externally.  
These organizational choices are of interest when the choice of scale is also taken into 
consideration.  Why do some firms choose a smaller scale and internal procurement 
combination while some choose a larger scale and both internal and external procurement? 
Of our 53 sample firms, 28 rely on vertically integrated systems or a system that uses 
internal procurement.  These companies include forestry, wood, and pulp and paper 
manufactures as well as food and agricultural companies that have integrated forward into 
biopower production.  Rather than sell their waste products to other processors or dispose of 
them, they have chosen to utilize their wastes in biopower production.  Thirteen of the 
sample firms procure all their biomass externally, using spot markets or contracts.  These   10
companies are generally traditional power companies that have chosen to enter biopower 
production.  Of these 13, three rely on spot markets while the other 10 use contracts ranging 
from 3 months to 20 years in length.  
The remaining 12 firms use both internal procurement and external procurement. 
These include wood and agricultural manufacturing companies that have increased the scale 
of their power plants beyond their own waste capacity or utilities that have partially 
integrated into fuel production.  
Determining whether the transaction cost theory is a reliable predictor of 
organizational form in the biopower industry is challenging.  Secondary data on variables 
such as asset specificity are unavailable and primary data collection techniques imperfect.   
From the perspective of the power generator a key variable is the flexibility of the 
generation technology with respect to the use of fossil fuels (van Loo and Koppejan, 2003).  
If the generator can easily convert to using fossil fuels the degree of physical asset specificity 
of the power plant would be low; the value of alternative uses of the power plant is high.  If it 
is difficult and costly to convert the power plant to the use of fossil fuels the degree of asset 
specificity would be high; the value of the power plant in alternative uses is low.  In the 
biopower survey generators are asked to rate the flexibility of their power plant as either: 
highly flexible, their power plant could easily be converted to use mainly fossil fuels without 
adjustments and delay, moderately flexible, their power plant could use mainly fossil fuels 
after minor adjustment and delays, or highly inflexible, their power plant can not use mainly 
fossil fuels without major adjustment or delay.  Table 1 summarizes the responses to this 
question.  
[Table 1 about here]   11
Scale of power plants was measured by the level of biomass inputs the generator uses 
per year.  The scale of the plants could be measured in various ways.  There are different 
measures of generation capacity such as, summer, winter, and name plate capacity.  
However, for a study of organizational form of biomass procurement, the quantity of biomass 
fuel used may be the most appropriate to determine the scale relationship to organizational 
form choice.  It is unclear what capacity in Mega Watts indicates especially if only a small 
percentage of that power is generated from biomass.  The range of biomass fuel used is a low 
of 70 tons per year and a high of 1.4 million tons per year.  The average use is 225 thousand 
tons with a standard deviation of 261 thousand tons. Table 2 summarizes these statistics.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Another explanatory variable included is a spatial asset specificity variable measured 
as the average hauling distance in increments of 0-10, 10-50, and over 50 miles.  Following 
Joskow’s (1985, 1987, 1990) work on coal-fired plants, high average hauling distances are 
expected to be positively related to external procurement and negatively correlated to internal 
procurement. Table 3 summaries this variable. 
[Table 3 about here] 
A final variable considered in this analysis is generation technology.  Most power 
plants that use biomass use a steam turbine technology.  However, the boiler technology may 
be co-fire, where a percentage of biomass fuel can be used with fossil fuels or direct fire 
where mainly biomass is used (van Loo and Koppejan, 2003).  There are 15 of 53 who 
indicate the use of a co-fire technology while 34 of 53 indicated they use direct fire.  Also, 
four of 53 indicated another technology, such as internal combustion or gasifier.  While we 
have no prediction on the sign of this variable, however, we include it as a control for   12
possible relationships between the technology chosen, asset specificity, and scale.  Table 4 
summarizes the explanatory variables used in this analysis and the expected signs. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Analytical methods 
Because our dependent variable is categorical, we use a multinomial logit model.
1  In this 
model firm i face J unordered choices.  The response probability, that firm i chooses choice j 




















  where Pij is the probability  
Yi=j or that firm i chooses category j given the explanatory variable vector X, βj is the 
estimated parameter vector and Xi is the observed characteristic vector of firm i.   
  In specific form, there are three choices of organizational form as the explanatory 
variable, so j = 0,1,2 and i = 53.  The log likelihood function for this multinomial logit can be 
expressed as:  ij
ij







 where dij=1 if firm i choose organizational form j.   
In results from this model the p-values are valid making significance tests meaningful 
while the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are not valid.  In order to get the partial 
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1 We considered, but rejected, using a nested logit and ordered probit or logit models.  A nested logit would be 
appropriate in an organizational assessment that featured both the governance level and contract level.  Choices 
of governance could be featured at the branch level while contract choices could be on the twig level.  However, 
we lack sufficient details on the contractual characteristics to specify such a nesting structure. We do not use an 
ordered probit or logit because our dependent variables lack an inherent rank ordering.   13




1 ) exp( β  , and the marginal effects of limited explanatory variables are 
calculated as the difference between probabilities (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Complicating issues include endogeneity such as simultaneity of organizational form 
and asset specificity, unobserved variables such as transaction costs and missing or biased 
observations, and causality between asset specificity and organizational form.  Saussier 
(2000) treats asset specificity as an explanatory variable explaining the choice of 
organizational form (the choice of contract completeness) in the French power industry but 
also models asset specificity as a simultaneous dependent variable in a two-stage least 
squares model.  Joskow (1987) and Masten and Crocker (1985) address the truncated data 
issue with a tobit maximum likelihood regression technique.  Masten et al. (1991) address the 
issue that transaction costs are not usually observed and linked to performance.  Linking 
transaction cost arguments to such performance measures as profitability and failure rates 
would improve the legitimacy of results.  However, studies that address these types of issues 
tend not to influence the support of the theory from those data but rather reinforced the 
validity of the tests.   
Given the limited data set of 53 observations, and various limited explanatory 
variables (scale is the only continuous variable), we focus on testing the basic theory against 
these data and interpreting the marginal effects.  Addressing endogeneity and related issues 
will be the focus of future research with more and better data. 
 
Results  
In this model the probability of the choice of organizational form (ORGFROM) is regressed 
against four key explanatory variables: flexibility with respect to fossil fuel use (FLEXFF) as   14
a measure of physical asset specificity, average hauling distance (AVEHD) as a measure of 
spatial asset specificity, scale of the plant (SCALE) measured in tons of biomass used per 
year and technology type (TECHTYPE).  Results are reported in table 5 and marginal effects 
in table 6.  
These results show support for transaction cost economic theory.  In this model, 
internal procurement (0) is the comparison group.  Average hauling distance and scale are 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level when external procurement (1) is the 
alternative organizational form.  When procurement type (2) is the alternative choice only 
scale is statistically significant.  This may indicate that there is not as much of a difference 
between internal procurement only and both internal and external procurement in terms of 
flexibility.  The model as a whole is statistically significant at the 95% level.   
[Table 5 about here] 
  The marginal effects are also consistent with TCE.  The marginal effects of the two 
asset specificity variables, flexibility with respect to fossil fuels and average hauling distance, 
have the signs expected when following the theory.  Also, the scale of the plant is found to 
increase the probability of observing external organization and decrease the probability of 
internal organization.  This is also consistent with the theory.  Table 6 reports these marginal 
effects.  
[Table 6 about here] 
The sign of the flexibility variable is consistent with the theory.  A change in 
flexibility from inflexible to flexible (Min to Max) increases the probability of observing 
external procurement by 22% and decreases internal procurement by 18%.  That is, a change 
from high asset specificity to low asset specificity, as measured by the flexibility indicator   15
increases the probability of observing external procurement by 22% and decreases the 
probability of observing internal procurement by 18%.  Similarly, when average hauling 
distance increases from 0-10 miles to 50+ miles the probability of observing external 
procurement increases by 31% and internal procurement decreases by 38%.  In other words, 
a change from high spatial asset specificity to low spatial asset specificity is associated with 
an increase in the probability of external organization and a decrease in the probability of 
internal organization.  
Scale also has the correct sign.  Williamson (1985) and Riordan and Williamson 
(1985) argue that market procurement has a scale advantage over internal organization 
because of demand or supply aggregation benefits.  This implies that external procurement is 
more likely when scale increases.  In this case it would be supply aggregation benefits that 
give the organizational form market a scale advantage.  Thus as scale increases the 
probability of observing market should increase.  Consistent with this account, we find that a 
10,000 ton increase in scale increase the probability of external procurement by 3.7% and 
decreases the probability of internal organization by 10%. A 10,000 ton change from the 
mean (-+1/2) reveals a similar 3.5% increase in observing external procurement and 10% 
decrease in observing internal organization.  A one standard deviation change from the mean 
reveals a 9% increase in observing external procurement and a 26% decrease in observing 
internal organization.  Finally, a change in scale from min to max increases the probability of 
observing external by 3.9% and the both category by 71% while decreasing the probability of 
internal organization by 75%.  The changes in all of these probabilities support the theory 
that market or external procurement will have a scale advantage over internal organization. 
   16
Implications 
Our analysis suggests that TCE can be useful in explaining not only the choice of 
organizational form but also scale of a processing facility.  Consider a hypothetical example 
of an existing wood or agriculture manufacturer that has insufficient waste products to meet 
the minimum efficient scale; the choice of scale of a biopower generation facility without 
transaction costs will lead to a larger scale to receive the benefits of scale economies while 
the manufacturer uses both internal procurement and external procurement. Yet empirical 
evidence suggests many manufacturers choose a smaller scale and internal organization only. 
Adding transaction costs to the analysis helps explain this phenomenon.  
Beyond supplies of its own waste products, wood and agricultural manufacturing 
companies would have to incur additional transaction costs to procure the additional supplies. 
The question then becomes are these additional transaction costs more than the scale 
economy benefits of increasing scale.  If the transaction costs are more than the scale 
economy benefits the manufacture chooses the smaller scale and the internal organization 
only option, otherwise the manufacture chooses a larger scale and both internal procurement 
and external procurement.  This argument is supported by figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In Figure 2, AC1 are the average costs of biopower production without external 
transaction costs taken into account, ACTC, the average costs of biopower production with 
transaction costs taken into consideration, and Xº is the current waste product or biomass 
input into the biopower production stage.  It is assumed that Xº is fixed and determined by 
the primary wood or agricultural manufacturing stage.  Without taking transaction costs into 
consideration the model would predict biomass input use of X* and internal procurement up   17
to Xº and external procurement beyond up to X* (point B); there are no transaction costs to 
retrieving external supplies and the cost minimizing firm will choose a larger scale to gain 
the economies of scale benefit while choosing to use both internal and external procurement.  
However, when transaction costs are taken into consideration the solution is 
indeterminate (as drawn point A and point C have equal average costs); it depends on the 
tradeoff between transaction costs and scale economies.  Taking both transaction costs and 
economies of scale into consideration will have implications both for the scale and type of 
organizational form chosen.  
  Complicating factors include the shape of the transaction costs curve or how 
transactions vary with scale.  While much of the transaction cost literature focuses on the 
relationship between transaction costs and asset specificity, the tradeoff between transaction 
costs and scale may be equally important.  To simplify the discussion here, a flat transaction 
cost curve is assumed.  Further, allowing asset specificity to change will result in multiple 
potential transaction curves for different organizational forms akin to figure 1 in this article. 
This will influence the shape of the transaction cost curve and hence impact the average cost 
curve.  Finally, the assumption that the existing supply of biomass waste Xº is less that the 
minimum efficient scale could also be challenged.  
  An additional implication of our research is that the factors leading to external 
procurement do not necessarily induce firms to procure all the relevant inputs on the market. 
That is, some firms choose to “make and buy.”  He and Nickerson (2006) document a similar 
phenomenon in the for-hire trucking industry, where some carriers use both employee drivers 
and contract drivers at the same time.  They suggest that concerns over efficiency, 
appropriability, and competition lead firms to organize each haul independently, rather than   18
choosing a single mode of organization for an entire class of transactions.  Our results 
suggest, similarly, that procurement decisions are more complicated than the standard TCE 
models suggest and that economies of scale are an important factor.  
 
Conclusions 
Organizational challenges to bioenergy industries may benefit from the application of 
transaction cost theory just as further refinement of the theory may benefit from challenging 
applications.  This article attempts to link these two areas. 
  While the biomass and bioenergy literature does address organizational and 
commercialization issues, in passing, an adequate organizational theory is lacking. 
Organizational economics and transaction cost economics in particular has evolved to the 
point where application to immature and developing industries seems appropriate.  However, 
theoretical questions such as the role of scale in the transaction cost model still exist.   
  In an attempt to address these issues transaction cost economics is applied to the 
United States biopower industry with a special focus of the effect of scale on the choice of 
organizational form.  Survey data from biopower generators reveals several important 
variables such as physical asset specificity, spatial asset specificity and scale of generation 
facilities.  These variables are regressed in a multinomial logit model against the choice of 
organizational form. Contrary to preliminary empirical evidence in the transaction cost 
literature scale is found to support the transaction cost theory. 
  Given this evidence both transaction costs and economies of scale are reconsidered in 
the choice of organizational form and scale of biopower generation facilities.  Transaction 
costs and economies of scale are demonstrated to be two key trade-offs in these decisions.       19
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Table 1: Fossil Fuel Flexibility in the Sample of Biopower Generators 
Flexibility Frequency  Percent  Cumulative 
Frequency 
Highly Inflexible  26  49.05  49.05 
Highly Flexible  12  22.64  71.69 
Moderately Flexible  15  28.30  100.00 
Total 53  100.00   
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics– Scale 









Scale  53  225,071.7 261,342.8 70  1,445,937 
 
Table 3: Frequency of Average Hauling Distances 
 Frequency  Percent  Cumulative 
Frequency 
0-10 miles  14  26.42  26.42 
11-50 miles  25  47.17  73.58 
Over 50  14  26.42  100.00 
Total 53  100.00   
   24
Table 4: Explanatory Variables and Expected sign 
Explanatory variable  Expected sign 
Flexibility to fossil fuel use   Decrease in the probability of observing 
internal organization 
Scale  Decrease in the probability of observing 
internal organization  
Average hauling distance  Decrease in the probability of  observing 
internal organization 
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Table 5: Regression Results: Multinomial Logit 
Log likelihood:  -44.523375      Number of 
observations: 
LR chi2(8):  
Prob > chi2:  










P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
FLEXFF  .6245263  .4469447      0.162      -.2514692      1.500522 
AVEHD  1.080492     .5978011      0.071      -.0911766 2.252161 
SCALE  3.52e-06     1.87e-06       0.060  -1.50e-07 7.18e-06 
TECHTYPE  -.8807087     .7510431      0.241  -2.352726      .5913089 
CONS  -2.898541  1.021664      0.005  -4.900966     -.8961153 
Organizational 
Form Both 
        
FLEXFF  .0789956      .4739609      0.868      -.8499506      1.007942 
AVEHD  .5419809     .5439205  0.319  -.5240838  1.608046 
SCALE 4.76e-06  1.86e-06  0.010  1.12e-06 8.40e-06 
TECHTYPE  .4868234     .5668151      0.390  -.6241138      1.597761 
CONS  -2.7934      .947754  0.003  -4.650963  -.9358361 
Outcome organizational form equal to 0 (internal organization) is the comparison group 
   26
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Model 
mlogit: Changes in Predicted Probabilities for ORGFORM 
 
FLEXFF      
  Average 
Change 
External Both  Internal 
Min to max  .14705233     .22057848  -.04019131     -.1803872 
     
AVEHD      
Min to max  .25442452     .31146399     .07017279     -.3816368 
     
SCALE      
Min to max  .50094266     .03968221     .71173181    -.75141397 
-+ 1/2  6.954e-07  3.576e-07     6.557e-07    -1.073e-06 
-+ sd/2  .17424998     .09363356      .1677414    -.26137498 
Marginal effect  6.822e-07     3.709e-07     6.524e-07    -1.023e-06 
     
TECHTYPE      
Min to max  .17964793    -.25556941     .26947188    -.01390249 
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Figure 1: Governance costs as a function of asset specificity 
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